Draft of 23 March 1998

Prepared by Matthew Wong

Historical demographic trends in North America (growth of the population; changing sex, age, age rural/urban distribution). The wheels of new production were churning, thanks to WW2, and what were needed in this equation were (human) resources. There were improved methods of contraception but the birthrate still soared. Demographers have subsequently attributed the baby boom of the 1950's to the fact that more people were getting married than formerly, they were marrying at an earlier age, and they were tending to have children in the first few years of marriage.

Soon in post war times, the long-run decline in the rate of population growth in the maturing industrial economy. The impact of the baby boom of the 1950's was not felt in the labor market until the 1960's and early 1970's the labor force increased from 55% of the population to about 65% in 1981.

Several reasons were put forward as to why a reduction in population growth was likely to promote output and employment and thereby contribute to economic development. First, it was argued that lower fertility (Canada-lowest fertility), and therefore reduced dependency, would lead to higher per capita savings and investment and an opportunity for faster growth in total income. Second, it was suggested that slower population growth (U.S.-slowest population growth) would affect the composition of expenditure, especially investment and public expenditure. Slower growth in numbers would mean that a smaller proportion of this expenditure was required to provide each added person with the average amount of physical capital and social services, and so more would available per person. Third, it is that a slower rate of growth of the labor force, together with increased investment, reduces unemployment and improves wage levels and the distribution of income. 4

The combination of demographic trends and participation patterns greatly altered the structure of the Canadian labor force between the end of the war and the early 1980’s, by which time most of the forces set in motion by the baby boom, seemed to have worked them selves out, except that the baby boomers hoarded the jobs, leaving the X generation destitute. Adult males in the 25 to 64-year age group accounted for almost 57 percent of the Canadian labor force in 1946. By 1981, this had fallen to 44 percent. Thus enabling women to take lower job positions, a form of internal migration to the workforce.

In United States today, about 32 million Americans are age 65 or older, and the growth of the older population is expected to accelerate sharply as the baby boom generation reaches old age.

Reallocations of resources across age and time take place in many ways and for many reasons. Some workers may be heeding warnings about lack of retirement savings. For many workers, it means a chance to cash in retirement savings. In 1996, six in ten job changers cashed out their retirement savings, instead of rolling it over into a tax-qualified Individual Retirement Account or employee-sponsored plan.

When workers spend their savings before retirement, their standard of living may be compromised in their later years. In addition, the likelihood of taking cash payment decreases with the amount saved. The workers with the greatest savings are the most likely to roll it over.

Eighty-one percent of workers whose savings totaled less than $3,500 cashed out, compared with 14 percent with savings of $50,000 to $100,000, and 5 percent with savings above $100,000.

Workers who elect a lump-sum payment over a direct rollover may eventually invest their money for retirement -- they have 60 days after accepting cash to put it into a tax-qualified account. While a relatively small amount of money may not seem worth hanging onto for retirement, financial planners argue that even small sums compound over time. Perhaps more importantly, the average person entering the work force today changes jobs eight times over his or her working life. 23.

Positive interest rates encourage people to defer consumption. This incentive is reinforced by a bio-cultural-institutional-behavioral need to provide for consumption in old age when productivity falls or retirement occurs, by a desire to leave bequests for children, and by a desire to hedge against future risk. Furthermore, in some settings, parents may be able to capture the surplus production of their young children, or their adult children may support them in old age. All these factors tend to make labor earning exceed consumption at younger ages and for consumption to exceed earnings at older ages, which requires a net upward reallocation of income across age, from younger to older 16.

In Caldwell's (1976) classic article on demographic transition theory, he states his views on the direction of interage resource flows. The fundamental issue in demographic transition, is the direction and magnitude of intergenerational wealth flows or the net balance of the two flows--one from parents to children and the other from children to parents--over the period from when people become parents until they die.17.

In Canada, the average age of the Canadian population has risen steadily from about 22 years at the time of the confederation to over 30 years in recent times. The deciphering that goes on in trends can be tricky.

Ten predictions made a decade ago are put to the test, revealing the power of demographics to anticipate trends.

The baby boom's middle age will transform the United States in three important ways: It will make the country more conservative; it will make the home the focus of American life; and it will make the nation richer. Predictions were based on the aging of the baby boom from 1985 (when boomers were mostly young adults aged 21 to 39) to 1995 (when boomers were aged 31 to 49). The number of predictions that came true during that decade shows the power of demographics to reveal the future.

It was not possible to test all the predictions, since many look decades into the future -- one even predicts the number of boomers who will live to age 100 (1 million). Another predicts the year in which the last boomer will die (2069). However, several predictions were specific to the 1990s.

Here is how they panned out:

Two-thirds of baby-boom households will be married couples by 1995: The results as of 1995: married couples accounted for 60 percent of households headed by 30-to-49-year-olds. This is a little lower than the two-thirds predicted.

The 60 percent figure is slightly less than predicted because boomers have postponed marriage and, once married, have since been divorced. The percentage of women aged 35 to 39 who have never married rose from 8 percent to 13 percent between 1985 and 1995. The share of 35-to-39-year-olds that are currently divorced stood at 14 percent in 1995, peaking at 16 percent among women aged 45 to 54.

By 1995, most baby-boom women will be sterile: Recently released results from the 1995 National Survey of Family Growth reveal the striking accuracy of this prediction. As of 1995, 57 percent of baby-boom women could no longer have children. Forty-five percent had been surgically sterilized, while another 12 percent could not have children because of impaired fecundity. These numbers will only grow in the future as more boomers reach menopause.

Eighty percent of baby-boom women will be working by 1995: As of 1995, 77 percent of women aged 30 to 49 were in the labor force, slightly below the predicted rate. The rate at which boomer women increased their participation in the work force slowed in the early 1990s because of the recession and because so many had young children at home. Yet, the rate shows no sign of reversing, or even stabilizing, in the near future. Boomer women who have invested money and time in education and careers are unlikely to quit their jobs in middle age. As they age, work could become even more important.

Working women will earn 74 percent of what working men earn by 2000. In 1996, the median annual earnings of women who worked full-time, year-round were already 74 percent of men's, up from 65 percent in 1985. This figure is likely to rise a few more percentage points by 2000.

By 1995, one in four baby-boom households will make more than $50,000 a year (in 1985 dollars): The sum of $50,000 in 1985 is now worth about $70,000 once inflation is factored in. Among the 44.5 million householders aged 30 to 49 in 1995, the proportion with incomes of $70,000 or more stood at 22 percent, pretty close to the 25 percent predicted. The proportion of baby-boom householders with incomes of $70,000 or more ranges from 15 percent among those aged 30 to 34 to 31 percent among those aged 45 to 49.

The baby boom will keep the stock market volatile for the rest of this century: This prediction was made before the 1987 stock market crash. Record-setting difficulties have now become almost common. Moreover, the market saw its largest-ever one-day point gain. With these vicissitudes is the baby-boom generation. The 35-to-44 age group held 41 percent of its financial assets in stock in 1995. This is up from 26 percent in 1989. The percentage of householders aged 35 to 44 who own stock grew from 41 percent to 47 percent during those years.

By the year 2000, three out of four baby boomers will own a home: This prediction is well on its way to coming true. The homeownership rate in the United States reached a record high in 1997, thanks to boomer buyers. The proportion of boomers who own homes ranged from 53 percent among 30-to-34-year-olds to 74 percent among 45-to-49-year-olds. As more boomers enter their 40s and 50s, the generation's overall homeownership rate should rise.

The buying habits of the baby boom will hurt the shopping malls. Middle-aged boomers are less likely than any other age group to visit shopping malls. When they go to malls, they spend less time there.

Boomers aged 35 to 44 spent 34 percent less time at shopping malls in 1997 than in 1994. For those aged 45 to 54, the decline was an even steeper 41 percent.

The baby boom will make baseball the sport of the 1990s: a foul ball here. This prediction was based on the fact that, historically, baseball is a sport most popular among the middle-aged. Baseball has also been weakened by boomers' interest in a diversity of sports. Basketball, hockey, soccer, and the new women's professional leagues are all benefiting from this trend.

The baby-boom vote will make a difference for the first time in the presidential election of 1992: Another bull's-eye. Boomers elected one of their own in 1992 and reelected him in 1996. Not only is Clinton a boomer, he is highly educated, experimented with marijuana, avoided the Vietnam War, married a working woman, has one child, grappled marital problems, and is willing to renegotiate his commitments.

Of the ten predictions examined, nine proved to be correct or nearly so. Demographic trends may be slow, but they're steady.

In these days of rapid change, demographics are one of the few things you can count on. 22.

Implications of demographic change for development

Economic demographic data are used to relate the size and composition of a country's population to its potential for economic growth and to study specific problems such as urban congestion, illegal immigration, and unemployment. Canada's economic overview: because of slower growth, Canada still faces high unemployment and a large public sector debt. Mexican's economic overview: business closures and cutbacks fueled unemployment.

The United States of America: Economic overview: The US has the most powerful, diverse, and technologically advanced economy in the world, with a per capita GDP, the largest among major industrial nations. US business firms enjoy considerably greater flexibility than their counterparts in Western Europe and Japan in decisions to expand capital plant, lay off surplus workers, and develop new products. The onrush of technology largely explains the gradual development of a "two-tier labor market" in which those at the bottom lack the education and professional/technical skills of those at the top and, more and more, fail to get pay raises, health insurance coverage, and other benefits. The years 1994-95 witnessed moderate gains in real output, low inflation rates, and a drop in unemployment below 6%. The capture of both houses of Congress by the Republicans in the elections of 8 November 1994 has intensified the debate over how the US should address its major economic problems. These problems include inadequate investment in economic infrastructure, rapidly rising medical costs of an aging population, sizable budget and trade deficits, and stagnation of family income in the lower economic groups. The outlook for 1996 was for continued moderate growth, low inflation, and about the same level of unemployment.

The labor force in Canada: Unemployment rate: 10% (1995 est.) plus considerable underemployment. In Mexico the unemployment is18%. (1990 estimate) In 1994, 74 percent of the working class and 63 percent of the middle class reported household incomes between $15,000 and $74,999. But 10 percent of the upper class also reported making less than $15,000, and 4 percent of the lower class reported making over $50,000 a year.

Educational level is a more reliable indicator that rises steadily with social class, although educational level for all groups has increased. The upper and middle classes still have the preponderance of bachelor and graduate degrees, but higher degrees are becoming more common among the working class. The proportion of bachelor's degrees held by working-class adults more than doubled between 1974 and 1994, from 4 percent to 10 percent. The proportion of two-year degrees held by working-class respondents increased by 5 percentage points, to 6.5 percent. Two percent of the working class had graduate degrees in 1994.

Similarly, the occupations that make up the working class are less clear-cut. Between 1988 and 1996, the proportion of managers and professionals in the working class increased by 4 percent, to reach 17 percent in 1996. The proportion of technical, sales and administrative workers also rose slightly. Conversely, the proportions of service employees, farm workers, and craft and skilled workers have declined. (It is not possible to compare occupations before 1988 because the classification scheme changed.) In addition, the number of part-time workers has increased across the board, but part-timers remain most prevalent in the lower and working classes.

Interest in organized labor is one of the attributes most common among the working class. This relationship is borne out in GSS data. Union membership is one of the clearest delineators between the working and other classes. Although union membership among U.S. workers has fallen across the board, for the last 25 years it has remained highest among those who claim working-class status.

There is changing structure of the new working class and unions are targeting somewhat younger, more ethnic, better-educated workers, and different occupations than they did 25 years ago. Coincidentally, just around the time UPS capitulated to strikers' demands for more jobs that are full-time and a better pension arrangement. More than one-third of all American workers belonged to unions in 1950. By 1997, less than 15 percent of workers (only 10 percent of nongovernment workers) were union members.

The trend toward unionization is growing among health-care professionals as well as among upscale service businesses that depend on younger workers. Social scientists see historic similarities between today's labor issues and those of the 1930s.

For today's working class, the commonality just might be age-old issues such as job security, autonomy on the job, occupational prestige, and the belief that hard work should be rewarded. The working class has always been the group most likely to rate job security as the most important reason for taking a job. 7.

In Immigration, Canada looks abroad for skilled workers. The shortage of skilled workers for high tech industries in Canada has forced companies to find an innovative solution. Organized job fairs in countries like Romania in 1997, and was flooded with qualified recruits. Right now Canada needs 50,000 high tech workers each year. Schools are turning out approximately 30,000 qualified candidates. Some of those 20,000 unfilled positions are going to workers from other countries, who are happy to immigrate to Canada.

Migration is a huge subject. In fact, it is in many respects four different subjects based on two dichotomies. The first is between the developed and the developing world, and the second is between internal and international migration.

The reasons for distinguishing these are, first, that the sources of data are different. Thus, the measures and methods used to analyze them tend also to be different. Second, the four subjects must be considered separately because the causes of migration, and consequently the patterns produced, are frequently very different in each. For example, whereas migration is predominantly from rural areas to urban areas in developing countries, it is either urban to urban or urban or urban to rural in developed countries. Who is a migrant? Defining precisely who is, and who is not, a migrant is extremely difficult.

NORTH AMERICA

Nonimmigrants: high-tech

Canada looks abroad for skilled workers

There is a shortage of skilled workers for high tech industries in Canada.

Right now Canada needs 50,000 high tech workers each year.

Some of those 20,000 unfilled positions are going to workers from other countries.

The Information Technology Association of America (ITAA), an organization of high-tech companies, plans to push in 1998 for an increase in or elimination of the 65,000-a-year limit on the number of H-1B visas available for foreign professionals and specialty workers. A separate program, the H-2B program, issued 13,000 nonimmigrant work visas to unskilled workers in FY97. The INS stopped issuing H-1B visas on August 25, 1997 when the 65,000 limit was reached. The INS resumed processing requests for H-1Bs in October 1997, and 3,000 H-1Bs had to wait to go to work legally. Some predict that the 65,000 cap on H-1B visas will be reached in FY 98 in May, four months before the end of the fiscal year. ITAA says that programmer salaries are rising by 20 to 28 percent a year; other surveys suggest nine- percent annual increases.

Information technology is the largest sector of the US economy, generating revenue of $865 billion a year in the $7 trillion US economy. One estimate, for example, is that for every $1 spent on programmer salaries, companies generate $43 in additional revenue, so that not filling a $55,000 computer programmer slot costs a company about $2.5 million in lost revenue. Given profit rates of 15 to 25 percent, this would suggest that a computer firm would willingly pay up to $400,000 a year to fill the vacancy.

The ITAA puts the number of job vacancies in high-tech firms at 190,000, based on a survey of 2,000 employers with a 14 percent response rate. Some employers count jobs currently filled by temporary or contract workers to be "vacant." However, US high-tech firms such as Microsoft hire only about two percent of those who apply for jobs. Many high-tech companies scan applications, and have computers reject all those that do not fit prescribed criteria. For example, applications are not reviewed by humans until a computer profile finds the person "interesting." Several recruiting companies may advertise the same job, adding to the perception that there are thousands of unfilled vacancies. Finally, high-tech companies reportedly prefer to hire foreigners or recent college graduates, who are believed to be willing to work very long hours. There are many organizations and individuals that dispute the ITAA's claim of a labor shortage. The unemployment rate for those over 50 in the computer industry is about 17 percent.

Intel reportedly aims to hire 70 percent new college graduates because they have no family and can work long hours. A programmer only lasts up to 10 years or so.13

Limitations on projections are especially severe for demand, since demand is a function of the economic cycle and of global events that are difficult, if not impossible, to predict. Some programmers complain that it is hard to find staff employment with the largest US high-tech companies. Microsoft and many other high-tech companies hire "perma-temps," workers who are employed alongside regular employees, but who are employees of the agencies that pay them. These agencies have subcontracts to do work for Microsoft. About 3,500 of 12,000 Microsoft workers in the Seattle area--27 percent-- are temporary workers employed by outside agencies; the average age of Microsoft employees is reportedly 34.

In 1990, the IRS concluded that many of Microsoft's freelance workers should be considered regular employees and Microsoft responded by turning to temp agencies to obtain workers. Under the new arrangement, Microsoft interviews and decides who will be hired, but the payrolling company issues checks, withholds taxes and otherwise acts as employer, taking about 30 percent from what Microsoft pays for the worker to cover taxes and basic benefit costs, as well as the agency's markup. As many as 800,000 of the nation's 2.5 million information technology workers may be contract workers with no job security. The Conference Board estimates that as many as 20 percent of US corporations use temps as more than 10 percent of their work force; other estimates put the percentage of temps in the high-tech industry at 40 percent.

About 200,000 of the 550,000 US computer programmers have a four-year college degree, and often not in computer science. The number of bachelor's degrees awarded in computer science fell 43 percent between 1986 to 1994; but has rebounded sharply since 1994. Starting salaries in 1996 were reported to be $34,462.

IMR is a "body shop" that sends programmers to major US firms for programming jobs that last 12 to 18 months. The article reported that the ITAA's estimate of 190,000 US programmer vacancies demonstrated a "shortage," and said that foreign countries have programmers well-trained in mundane technologies that many American students shun. However, hiring is very selective; well under half of the qualified Brazilians interviewed by the recruiter were offered US jobs by the recruiter.

High-tech and Ag Comparisons. Many of the arguments about the need for foreign programmers parallel arguments for foreign farm workers, in part because the director of ITAA once lobbied for foreign farm workers. The need for foreign workers is justified by private and government studies that emphasizes the importance of the industry and the losses that are, or would be, sustained without additional temporary or permanent foreign workers.

There is a push for easy or simplified access to foreign workers, but little discussion of how to keep the industry focused on alternatives to foreign workers once they are made easily available.

Advocates of bringing in guest workers argue that they are more expensive than US workers, implying that, if US workers are available, they are hired first, so that only jobs that cannot be filled with US workers after exhaustive searches are filled by foreigners. Worker advocates counter that US employers prefer the foreigners, even if there are visa and travel costs involved, because the foreigners are in the US for one purpose--to fill the US job--and they are selected for ability.

In US agriculture, this preference has led to about 70 percent of the work force being immigrants, including 35 percent unauthorized immigrants, and an industry less able to adjust to the US labor market than it was in the mid-1960s.17.

In 1985, the National Science Foundation projected a "shortfall" of 692,000 bachelor's degrees in natural science and engineering. However, the NSF report was based on a methodology that considered only supply, not demand, and the 1990 recession and the end of the Cold War led to a surplus of scientists and engineers, not a shortage.

An estimated one-fourth of the computer programmers worldwide are of Indian origin, and India is exporting both software and programmers. The number of computer training institutions in India is rising, with tuition ranging from $4 to $100 a month; one school has 150,000 programmers in training.

Some Indian programmers are able to work for US companies in India, via so-called "virtual immigration." Indian programmers receive about one-third of US wages. 18.

INS: Enforcement, Asylum, Fees Enforcement. The INS has 12,400 immigration officers authorized to carry a gun and make arrests, more than the 11,300 federal prison guards or the 10,400 FBI agents. Some 74,500-armed federal agents had arrest powers in mid-1996. The Border Patrol announced in January that after four months of Operation Rio Grande in south Texas, apprehensions had fallen about 25 percent from year-earlier levels. However, INS acknowledged that even with 850 agents, it has been unable to shut down the principal smuggling corridor, US highway 77, used by an estimated 75 percent of undocumented immigrants. Inspectors on the bridges between Mexico and the US report that the number of persons attempting to enter the US with false documents has increased.

There are over 500 million entries into the US each year. Section 110 of the 1996 IIRIRA required the INS to develop a system for tracking entries and exits by September 30, 1998. The intent was to match records of entries and exits and thereby reduce the number of visa overstayer, who were believed to account for about 40 percent of the five million unauthorized foreigners in the US in Fall 1996.

There were 116 million land entries from Canada in 1996, and Canadians protested that an entry/exit system on the northern border would lead to intolerable delays. Congress is considering bills to delay the implementation of the entry/exit system until September 30, 1999; several bills would postpone it indefinitely.

The INS in January 1998 announced that it is halting deportation hearings involving Haitians who were paroled into the United States or who filed for asylum before the end of 1995. In April 1997, 3,900 deportation cases were pending against Haitians.

Advocates say that 85 percent are ordered deported. Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), the INS can refuse entry to persons arriving in the US without any documents or with false documents to their countries of origin if they cannot demonstrate a "credible fear" of persecution and remain in the US while their application for asylum is considered.

Before the INS refuses entry to a person requesting asylum, the INS must advise the foreigner that she may state the reasons why she faces a "credible fear" of persecution at home. If two INS officers decide the applicant has no credible fear, she is removed, although her application for asylum is adjudicated. The INS is using this "expedited removal" procedure, which went into effect April 1, 1997, to refuse entry to about 1,000 foreigners arriving in the US each week. There is no statistical data available on those who have been refused entry, but several have been businessmen whom the INS accused of entering the US to live permanently. Some observers note that many of those refused entry are well-educated foreigners with family members in the US who fear persecution at home because of their political opinions.

1.7 million foreigners have applied for naturalization and are awaiting INS interviews; the wait is up to 24 months.

Management. In January 1998, the Clinton administration rejected the recommendation of the US Commission on Immigration Reform to convert the

INS into an immigration control agency to shift the granting of most to immigration benefits such as naturalization to the State Department. The CIR said that the INS suffered from "mission overload," and that there was a fundamental contradiction between preventing illegal immigration and conferring benefits on immigrants.

The Clinton administration accepted the CIR's findings that the INS is not fulfilling its missions effectively, but prefers to restructure it rather than take away major functions. It has hired a consulting firm to study how to restructure the INS to improve its efficiency, with a report due March 1, 1998.

The INS is introducing a high-tech green card or immigrant visa to replace the 10 million valid green cards in circulation. The new green card includes personal information that is printed, in a hologram, and in a computer-readable portion of the card that can be read via a CD-ROM.

The INS is reconsidering its 1991 decision to permit private firms to conduct citizenship testing.19

In 1960, there were about 600,000 Mexican-born residents of the US, and in 1970, more US residents were born in Italy, Germany and Canada than in Mexico. In 1980, there were two million Mexican-born US residents, and in 1990, about 3.5 million.

Between 1990 and 1996, 3.3 million immigrants moved into the 10 metro areas with the largest immigrant populations, while 3.6 million mostly US-born residents moved out of these areas. The Census Bureau reported in January that 370,000 blacks moved to the South between 1990 and 1995, double the 1985-90 number. In 1900, 90 percent of Blacks lived in the south.

In December 1997, the US Department of Education reported that 62 percent of Latino adults had completed high school, compared with 92 percent of non-Hispanic whites and 83 percent of blacks. The 29 million US Latinos are about 10 percent of the US population.

California: Bilingual Ed/Los Angeles Bilingual Education. The English for the Children or Unz initiative that would reduce bilingual education in California public schools came under fire in January from Prop. 187 supporters because the Unz initiative would repeal that part of Prop. 187 that prohibits unauthorized children from attending K-12 schools.

Prop. 187 supporters point out that "all of California's children" include unauthorized children, and that Unz opposed Prop. 187; they pledge to oppose the Unz initiative.

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a lower court ruling that prevents California from offering the same welfare benefits they received to those who move into the state from other states for their first 12 months in California. The California Primary Care Association (CPCA) immediately announced that it was directing its 250 member clinics to ignore the ban, and continue to provide prenatal care to all patients.

Population. The nation's 10 largest Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSA) included 84 million residents in 1996, or one-third of the US population, led by New York, 19.9 million; Los Angeles, 15.5 million; Chicago, 8.6 million; Washington-Baltimore, 7.2 million; San Francisco-San Jose, 6.6 million; Philadelphia, 6 million; Boston, 5.6 million; Detroit, 5.3 million; Dallas, 4.6 million; and Houston, 4.3 million.

California's population rose to 33 million in July 1997; the increase included a net 21,300 internal migrants from other states. Between July 1992 and July 1996, California lost a net 1.2 million residents via internal migration. During the 1980s, California regularly received more than 100,000 net migrants from other states. Asian-Americans received more dollars (40 percent of the total) in 1996 under the Small Business Administration program for disadvantaged minority-owned businesses than Latinos, who received 33 percent.

Employment. The US issues about 20 types of nonimmigrant visas that permit employment, among them A visas for foreign government officials and NAFTA TN visas for professionals from Canada and Mexico employed in the US. Nonimmigrant visas permit foreigners to be in the US for a specific time and purpose.

Nonimmigrant visas that permit employment are meant to fill vacant US jobs; add to the supply of US talent; facilitate US business; enrich US life with foreign athletes and entertainers; and permit foreign students to work and learn in the US. Most categories of nonimmigrant workers are not limited or capped, but there is a limit of 65,000 H-1B visas a year and 66,000 H-2B visas a year.

US officials who administer these programs are instructed not to grant them to people whose aim may be to remain in the country. All foreigners applying to enter the US temporarily are assumed to be intending immigrants, and the burden is on the foreign visitor to prove that she will, in fact, return to an established residence abroad when US studies, the job, or other reason for being in the US ends. Two separate agencies, the Department of State's consular offices abroad, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service at US ports of entry, have the authority to decide that a would-be temporary visitor may be an intending immigrant, and to deny that person admission, even if her US employer has received certification to employ her temporarily. On the other hand, the US allows non-immigrant visa-holders in most categories to bring their families with them to the US, to be treated as employees in the US labor market, and thus to be protected by minimum wage and union-organizing laws on the same basis as US workers, and to adjust to permanent resident or immigrant status while in the US. The exceptions to the adjustment-to-immigrant option are trainees and exchange visitors, who must return home for six months to two years.

Marianas. The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources is expected to consider a bill in February 1998 that would limit the use of foreign workers in garment factories in the Mariana Islands, a US commonwealth since 1986 that is about 1,800 miles from China. About $700 million worth of apparel was produced in Saipan factories in 1997, labeled "Made in USA," and shipped to the US. The pending bill would raise the island's minimum wage from $3.05 to the US standard of $5.15 per hour, which may reduce the attractiveness of importing guest workers to sew garments in the Marianas.

Many of the H-1A nurses became permanent residents and others remained illegally in the US after their visas expired. The H1-A program that admitted foreign nurses expired in 1996. In Illinois, full-time registered nurses earn $15 to $24 an hour; nurses from temporary agencies who fill in for missing nurses cost the hospital $55 per hour.

Mexico's Foreign Relations Secretariat (SRE) in January 1998 published the new dual nationality law, which becomes effective March 20, 1998. Mexicans who possess or have acquired another citizenship will have to present a Mexican citizenship certificate, passport, or birth certificate when they participate in any service exclusively for Mexican citizens.

In Mexico City and other Zone A cities, the minimum wage is 30 pesos a day, or about $4 a day. About 15 percent of Mexico City workers earn the minimum wage, 32 percent earn up to between one and two times the minimum, 20 percent earn between two and three times the minimum, 16 percent between three and four times the minimum, and 17 percent earn five times the minimum wage or more, the equivalent of more than $550 a month.

Mexico's unemployment rate fell to 2.8 percent in December, 1997, the lowest since 1992; some 800,000 jobs were created in 1997. Mexico's unemployment rate is measured in some cities as the number of economically active persons over the age of 12 who tried to find employment but did not work even one hour, with or without pay, during the previous week.

Mexico has no unemployment insurance system, which explains why the unemployment rate is low, but Mexican workers laid off from formal sector jobs are entitled to severance pay, which is a minimum of three months pay.

Predictions of Mexico's economic path in 1998 centered on GDP growth of about 5.5 percent, inflation of 14 percent, and a peso/dollar exchange rate of 8.5 pesos to US$1 by the end of 1998. In 1997, Mexico imported goods worth $110 billion and exported goods worth $110 billion.

Maquiladoras. Some one million Mexicans were employed in 3,700 maquiladoras in December 1997, according to the National Maquiladora Exporting Council (CNIME), up dramatically from 330,000 workers and 1,120 plants in 1987. The CNIME projected that, by 2000, there would be 1.5 million Mexicans employed in 5,000 maquiladoras. Maquiladoras exported goods worth $42 billion in 1997. CNIME said that the average maquiladora wage is 70 pesos per day ($8.50). Many Mexicans complain that, although maquiladoras produce jobs, in thirty years they have produced very few homegrown spin-off industries or entrepreneurs.

Maquiladoras are foreign-owned plants that typically import components that are assembled in Mexico, and then export the finished products such as televisions or car parts--only five to 10 percent of the parts used in maquiladoras are produced in Mexico. They are often referred to as in-bond plants, since foreign owners are permitted to import machinery and components duty-free; no tariffs are paid if the products are re-exported from Mexico.

Economic success in Tijuana is apparent in the fact that Tijuana has a higher percentage of homeowners than most other Mexican cities; an estimated half of the maquiladora workers are home owners, and service-sector jobs in hotels and restaurants pay more than assembly jobs in maquiladoras.

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was four-years old on January 1, 1998. Evaluations of NAFTA's effects on Mexico-US migration generally agree that NAFTA has not significantly reduced the flow. (Some observers believe that NAFTA helped Mexico to recover faster from the economic crisis and peso devaluation of 1994-95 than it would otherwise have done, so that NAFTA may have prevented an even-larger increase in Mexico-US migration.)

The best current estimates are that about 300,000 Mexican-born persons settle in the US each year, and that over half are unauthorized. There appears to be little that can be done within the NAFTA framework to deal with (unauthorized) migration. NAFTA's migration provisions deal only with trade-related migrants, such as intra-company transfers, and with professionals--a maximum of 5,500 a year can enter the US, but only 243 arrived in FY96.

Second, there is no strong desire in Canada and the US to take the steps toward closer integration that might justify significant foreign aid or other assistance for Mexico, or to relax immigration restrictions. Instead, sensitivity to sovereignty issues seems to be rising as economic integration proceeds, so that, for example, US immigration restrictions can be increased even as Mexico becomes one of the major trading partners of the US.

There is little sentiment to shift some US border control expenditures to promote economic development in Mexico, because there is too little certainty that such a shift would reduce (unauthorized) migration in any predictable time period. Mexico on February 27, 1992 revised Article 27 of its constitution, ending land redistribution, permitting peasants to rent or sell ejido or communal land, and permitting both foreigners and corporations to buy land in Mexico. Under Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917, peasants could petition Mexico's agrarian reform ministry to redistribute large private land holdings to communal ejidos, and then to grant ejidatario members and their heirs rights to the land as long as they actively worked and lived on it. In this manner, ejidos internalized population growth, resulting in ever-smaller plots of land as the rural population increased.

Some observers expected the revision of Article 27 to unleash a wave of Mexico-US migration. However, empirical studies suggest that Article 27 is not the primary cause of increased migration for two reasons. First, there was already a considerable amount of illegal and quasi-legal land selling and renting before 1992, especially by the families of workers who migrated to the US. Second, the Mexican government has been very slow to organize meetings and distribute titles to ejido land to ejidatarios and communal farmers, so that ejido land can be rented and sold. Third, the more immediate factors involved in migration seem to be the peso/dollar exchange rate, the reduction of agricultural subsidies in Mexico and the demand for Mexican workers in the US.

Population. Within Mexico, Mexicans are becoming more mobile. In 1992, 20 percent of all Mexicans lived outside their state of birth. States with high percentages of natives living in other states included Mexico City, 42 percent of those born in Mexico City lived in another state in 1992 and Zacatecas, 32 percent. States with low outmigration to other Mexican states included Chiapas and Nuevo Leon--only eight percent of the natives of these states lived in another Mexican State in 1992. Mexican states attracting large numbers of in-migrants from other states in 1992 including Quintana Roo--60 percent of residents were born in another state--and Baja California, 50 percent of residents were born in other states.

Haitians. Haitians in January 1998 entered the Dominican Republic to begin the eight-month sugar cane harvest at the same time that "illegal" Haitians were being expelled. Some 16,000 workers are hired for the annual sugar harvest; most are Haitians, despite a 30 percent unemployment rate among Dominicans. The Haitians cross the border without papers, and are given physical examinations and then issued identification cards that allow them to work through the harvest.

In 1996, Canada granted 1,700 of 3,900 requests for immigrant visas, and 3,850 of 6,700 requests for visitor visas. In some cases, Canada requires DNA testing if

Haitians settled in Canada want to sponsor their relatives, but have no proof of their relationship.

If two countries with the same technologies (production functions) use the same two factors of production, capital and labor, to produce the same two goods in two countries that differ in their endowments of capital and labor, then, if the two countries engage in free trade, each country will export the good more intensive in the factor that is relatively more abundant in that country, or Mexico will export labor-intensive tomatoes and import capital-intensive airplanes. NBER WP 6209 concludes that in a closed economy, immigration does not yield a net social benefit if it hurts unskilled resident workers, and that changing US trade patterns put downward pressure on unskilled US workers. Additionally, across 75 countries between 1963 and 1992, there is little evidence of earnings convergence between countries despite more trade.

3.Conclusions

(Relating items in #2 to current situation in each of the three countries) Economic Labor forces. In the U.S. and Canadian aging society, the growth of the work force slows down.6 For Mexico to embrace technology in the mid-1990's would be mis-guided, just as it would have been wrong for Canada to do so in the 1970's. The Mexicans' need is not to save labour but to save jobs for their many young entrants to the job market. But as Mexico's trading partner, we have to accept that, because the supply of Mexican labor is so large, the wages Mexican workers can command will be lower than would be acceptable in Canada. This not a malevolent policy imposed by advocates of free trade but rather an inevitable result of the different demographic profiles of the partner countries.8.

Economic indicators show a steady polarization between incomes of the top-earning households and the lowest-income households. Only the richest Americans have seen any real income growth in the last decade. Incomes of the top 5 percent of Americans grew 37 percent between 1984 and 1994, compared with a meager 1- percent increase on the bottom.

Racial diversity among the lower, working, and, to a lesser extent, middle class is increasing, while the upper class is becoming less racially diverse. Between 1974 and 1994, the proportion of whites who claimed working-class status decreased 9 percent, while the proportion of blacks grew 3 percent and those of other races rose 5 percent. The shift was even more pronounced for the lower class, and somewhat less so for the middle class. Meanwhile, the proportion of whites claiming upper-class status increased, while the proportion of blacks decreased.12.

The demand for health care is an important factor, which has a direct bearing on mortality as well as the levels of health care and nutrition in the developing world, is the supply of food. 2 On the demand side, there are several reasons why people in developing countries, particularly the poor, want large families. For example, most poor parents worry about who will take care of them when they are old or ill, One reason such parents look to children for help in disability and old age is the lack of safe alternatives.3.

When faced with decisions on spending in health care in Canada, usually money is spent more in the following priority order: 1.Medical equipment and technology 2.Medical research 3.Hospital beds and rooms 4.Staff/Employees. The real question now is 'should we take care of what we now have instead of delving into new areas' as far as education and health care goes. Canada's health care system is the second costliest per capital in the world after that of the United States.24. The older, wiser Canada may well just leave the spending decisions to the federal Government. Recession has not help the current money problem, but optimism is figuring out the economy and figuring out our own micro situation and responsibilities.

Migration

One in 20 Americans lives in a micropolitan area. These small cities and their environment offer many of the same job opportunities, cultural activities, and other amenities that big cities do, but on a more human scale and often at a lower cost.

Big metropolitan areas are big magnets, drawing 80 percent of the U.S. population and newspaper headlines. However, scattered across the country are small cities offering an alternative to large-scale city life. The fastest-growing small cities are outpacing metro hot spots such as Atlanta and Colorado Springs.

The litany of big-city evils is familiar: crime, failing schools, pollution, and traffic jams. Many metropolitan residents tire of metropolitan stress and prices. In addition, those who have established their careers or are looking for a little more home for their money, often look beyond big cities.

The suburbs, the alternative of the past 50 years, are not as enticing as they once were. Like central cities, suburbs are in the crosshairs. High prices, high taxes, and traffic jams are also accepted features of many suburbs. Meanwhile, older suburbs are showing themselves vulnerable to the decline once thought reserved for abandoned central cities. Older suburbs in the Washington [D.C.] area are becoming a lot more like older cities.

Of course, the urban or suburban resident who is tired of traffic, prices, and the stress of crowding, noise, and crime can escape to the country. However, for many, this option may be too drastic. What's left? Small cities.

What's Micropolitan?

"Micropolitan areas" are small cities located beyond congested metro areas. The best micros offer "city" benefits on a manageable scale -- community without the crush, services without the stress. They are large enough to attract jobs, restaurants, diversions, and community organizations, but small enough to sidestep the traffic jams, high crime rates, and high property taxes often associated with heavily urbanized areas.

Many micros are surrounded by countryside, or are close to national parks and wilderness. Few are truly isolated. Apart from extreme examples such as Fairbanks, Alaska, more than half of small cities is within 50 miles of a metropolitan city center.

The median price of a small-city home was 68 percent of the national average in 1990; the average per-capita property tax bill was 60 percent of the national average in 1992. Crime rates are lower, on average, too. The total crime rate in micropolitan America was 25 percent below the national average in 1994; the violent crime rate was 56 percent below.

How small is a small city? There is no official government definition of a micropolitan. As used here, a micropolitan consists of at least one central city and one surrounding county. Primarily, it may not be part of an officially designated Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). This puts the micro outside the metro squeeze and beyond suburban sprawl. The central city must contain at least 15,000 residents, and the surrounding county must contain at least 40,000 residents (including the central city). The smallest micro is Poplar Bluff, Missouri (population 40,146); the largest is Torrington, Connecticut (population 178,523).

The U.S. has 193 small cities that currently qualify as micropolitans, according to 1994 population estimates. Micros were home to 14 million people that year, or 5 percent of the U.S. population. Nearly 27 percent of Idaho and New Mexico residents live in small cities. In Maine and Montana, the share is 23 percent; in New Hampshire and Oregon, 17 percent. Ohio has 1.1 million people living in 14 small cities across the state. Six states have no micros, either because their populations are too densely packed or too sparsely scattered beyond their metros: Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and South Dakota.

Small cities differ as dramatically as Key West, Florida differs from Ames, Iowa. They run the gamut from Texas border towns to northeastern college towns. If you're thinking of relocating to a small city, it's a good to consider them by criteria: housing, community assets, weather, public safety. Alternatively, if marketing to a small city, you want to identify the fastest growing, the wealthiest, the best educated. The Rating Guide scores each micropolitan in the ten categories of climate and environment, diversions, economy, education, community assets, health care, housing, public safety, transportation, and urban proximity.

The ten category scores are also totaled for a final score. This score, weighing all categories equally, provides a measure of the overall quality of life in each micro. It's by this total score that Ames, Iowa, for example, ranks, as one of the top micros and Key West, Florida West, does not. Key West is strong in snorkeling, daiquiris, mild winter weather, and high retail sales. However, if you are in search of a job, a moderately priced three-bedroom house, below-average crime rates, and proximity to a national retail market, Ames is a much better bet.

The State of the Micropolitan Nation

Micros may be a world apart from metro hassles, but they are strongly influenced by the fortunes of neighboring large cities. A thriving metro may in time expand to a micro's boundaries. The results lead to a micro outgrowing both its small-city character and its micropolitan status.

It's largely due to metro expansion that the number of micropolitans decreased from 219 to 193 between 1989 and 1994. 11 became the central cities (including 3 in North Carolina: Rocky Mount, Goldsboro, and Greenville). The majority -- 24 -- joined adjacent existing metro areas. In fast-growing states, small-city turnover of both types was particular. Four of Arizona's six micros graduated to metro status in the five-year period: Yuma and Flagstaff became MSAs; Apache Junction-Casa Grande and Bullhead City joined neighboring MSAs.

Not surprisingly, some of the top-ranking small cities of the late 1980s proved so popular that they outgrew their small-city status. San Luis Obispo, the number-one rated micro in the late 1980s, became a metropolitan area. Hattiesburg, Mississippi previously rated number six, did the same. Fourteen micros were lost to population declines, four of them in Louisiana. The D.C. metro area had grown out into Virginia, and city- and suburb-weary metro residents began to discover Fredericksburg. Most newcomers kept their jobs in D.C., and a commuter light-rail line was constructed to shuttle them back and forth. It also served as a selling point to potential newcomers.

During this time, the District's economy continued to draw people to the area, pushing the suburban fringes of the city further outward. The growth rates of the three Virginia counties that lie between the capital and Fredericksburg illustrate the drive to the outermost edges of the metro. Fairfax, closest to D.C. and the most saturated, grew 7 percent between 1990 and 1994.The next county to the south, Prince William, grew 11 percent. Stafford, whose southern boundary borders Fredericksburg (an independent city not associated with any county), grew 25 percent.

Most small cities are as influenced by metropolitan and regional population trends as Fredericksburg is. Technological access has removed some of the geographic constraints on where people live and work. Some small cities, notably in the West, benefit from rapid increases in region-wide growth and a strong local economy without metro proximity. Elko, Nevada is closer to the Great Salt Lake Desert than to a major city, but only two metro areas grew more quickly in the first half of this decade.

Slow growth in the Midwest has kept micro activity there to a minimum in recent years. Nearly 29 percent of all micros are located in Midwestern states. The region had no net gain, adding seven and losing seven micros between 1989 and 1994. The nonmetro population increased 9 percent between 1990 and 1994 in western states, compared with metro growth of 7.5 percent. In the Pacific states, nonmetro areas grew 9 percent, compared with 6 percent for metros.

Newcomers are not discouraged by the relative isolation of some western micros. St. George, Utah, has staked out a stretch of Interstate 15 about 115 miles northeast of Las Vegas, Nevada, and 250 miles southwest of Provo, Utah. However, plenty of people are finding the way. Californians were especially adept at this during the recession of the early 1990s. St. George's population leapt 34 percent between 1990 and 1994. That is 7 points faster than Las Vegas; more than three times the rate of Salt Lake City, Provo-Orem, and Flagstaff; and more than eight times the national average. What began as a stream of retirees in the late 1980s soon widened to include younger families. The local boom in housing starts and services provided the jobs, which in turn created additional demands that spur further growth.

Micropolitans range from southern beaches to western mountains, from the pacific coastline to Midwest wheat fields. Some are characterized by their newness, others by centuries of New England history. But three categories describe a significant share of small cities, including some of the most highly rated. Two in three top-25 micros are college towns, vacation spots, or hot spots.

College Towns

Three of the top-four micros are college towns, and college towns claim six slots on the top-20 list. 19 small cities had college populations comprising 20 percent or more of their total in 1990. Many are home to state universities. In Ames, Iowa (Iowa State University), and Carbondale, Illinois (Southern Illinois University), nearly one resident in three is a college student.

Not surprisingly, college towns have high levels of educational attainment. Not only do resident faculty and graduate students boost the share of adults who hold at least a bachelor's degree, but the intellectual climate often tempts recent grads to settle in, at least for a while. Forty-two percent of adults aged 25 and older in Ithaca, New York, held a college degree in 1990. That's equal to Manhattan and twice the national average. Ithaca hosts both Cornell University and Ithaca College. Two in three Ithaca adults either are college graduates or on their way. In Ames, 38 percent of adults claim at least a bachelor's degree, and in Bozeman, Montana (home of Montana State University), the share is 34 percent.

College towns are attractive options for companies looking for a well-educated work force. The presence of local colleges and universities also boosts community arts and educational offerings. Universities often draw national performers, art exhibits, live theater, museums, lectures, and other events.

College towns are typically slow growing places. Few of the highest-rated college towns grew more than 3 percent in population between 1990 and 1994. Those that grew at higher rates were more likely to be influenced by regional growth and metro expansion (such as Statesboro, Georgia) than by a red-hot collegiate economy. However, if they are not prone to booms, college towns are also relatively immune to busts. A steady stream of students guarantees certain evenness to retail, service, and rental housing markets.

Vacation Spots

Small shares of small cities are primarily holiday destinations, but these are prominent on the top-20 list. Micros such as Hilton Head, South Carolina, and Wenatchee, Washington, boast some of the strongest retail sales, highest incomes, and fastest growth in micropolitan America.

Five of the best small cities on beaches and ski slopes drew new residents at rates at least twice the national average between 1990 and 1994. Bozeman, Montana (a vacation town that also hosts a university), grew 15 percent; Hilton Head, South Carolina, by 12.5 percent; and Traverse City, Michigan, by 9 percent.

Hotels, ski lifts, and boardwalks boost retail trade. Per-capita sales in Traverse City, Michigan, reached $11,700 in 1992, considerably above the national median of $7,400. In addition to tourists who spend, these towns attract affluent year-round residents. Per-capita personal income in 1994 was $25,160 in Key West, Florida, 41 percent above the national average. In Hilton Head, income was 22 percent above the national average; in Wenatchee, Washington, 19 percent.

Hot Spots

A third group of top-ranking micros can be characterized by their fast growth. They may differ in economy or setting, but their popularity drew newcomers at rapid rates throughout the first half of the decade. Thirty-nine small cities grew at least twice the national average of 4 percent between 1990 and 1994. Of these, 11 grew more than three times the national average.

Rapid growth in several small cities reflects unusual circumstances. Hinesville, Georgia owes its rapid rise in population to large transfers of military personnel to nearby Fort Stewart. The port-of-entry towns Eagle Pass and Del Rio in Texas grew almost exclusively from Mexican immigration.

Hot spots are popular for differing reasons, but a major factor for most is proximity to a metropolitan area. Such micros are popular with metro workers who either don't want, or can't afford, to live closer to the central city. Others choose to be close -- but not too close -- to the shopping, sports, and arts of a big city. Mount Vernon, Washington, for example, is convenient to Bellingham and an easy day trip to Seattle, yet retains its small-city attractions.

Bozeman, Montana can't boast of being close to much besides nature and Butte. However, of course, the outdoors is a large part of Bozeman's attraction, especially the skiing. The few other isolated hot spots, such as Elko, Nevada, and Fairbanks, Alaska, draw newcomers through the strength of their economies. Isolated hot spots must offer newcomers everything from a decent job to an affordable home, adequate health care, community organizations, and diversions. A reason why some hot spots fail to rank well overall despite a strong economy and a stock of new housing.

Hot spots are not necessarily the wealthiest micros. Median per-capita personal income for the 20 micros with double-digit population growth between 1990 and 1994 was just 6 percent above national median income in 1994 (top-10 micropolitans for 1994 personal per-capita income)

rank micropolitan per-capita income

1 Vero Beach, FL $28,977

2 Torrington, CT 25,912

3 Key West, FL 25,160

4 Concord, NH 24,734

5 Carson City, NV 24,422

6 Newport, RI 22,465

7 Columbus, IN 22,464

8 Salina, KS 22,125

9 Elko, NV 21,785

10 Muscatine, IA 21,742

U.S. average $21,696

Micro average $17,812

Suburbs rule in Illinois in the next century. Several counties near Chicago may grow fast, and their residents could have good per-capita incomes, as well. Illinois once boasted the All-American test market, Peoria. What sold in Peoria would sell in America. With changing times -- particularly the decline of family farms and manufacturing industries -- Illinois and Peoria have since been overshadowed as a market benchmark. But Illinois is still an important market. It's the nation's sixth largest state, with an estimated population of 11.8 million in 1995, according to the Census Bureau. Its population is expected to grow between 1995 and 2020, albeit at a slower pace than the U.S. as a whole, at 12 percent compared with 23 percent for the nation.

It's where Illinois is growing that makes it the state's future suburban, and Hispanic, according to 1997 county population projections prepared for the Illinois Bureau of the Budget. Counties projected to grow the fastest to 2020 are those surrounding Chicago, St. Louis, and Springfield. Suburban growth around Chicago, in particular, is meaningful because that's where the money is. Much of the urban and suburban growth in Illinois will probably belong to the state's burgeoning Hispanic population. Hispanics are expected to increase their numbers much faster than non-Hispanics. Hispanics may account for 52 percent of newcomers to Illinois to 2020.

There is more to Illinois than its biggest city, because the state is still mostly farmland. However, the story of its rural population is strikingly different than for cities and suburbs. Rural counties are expected to decline and grow older, as rural-based agricultural and mining employment continues to decline.

As with the rest of the nation, the loss of manufacturing jobs in the 1970s and 1980s hit Illinois hard. The state population grew just 3 percent in the 1970s -- a low matched only by the Great Depression years of the 1930s. In the 1980s, population growth came to a complete halt.

The numbers began growing again in the 1990s, thanks to new manufacturing jobs in some counties, and expansion of service industries and the jobs they create. The state's population is projected to grow 6 percent between 1990 and 2000, and 5 percent in each of following two decades.

This below-average population growth is likely to occur despite a small net migration loss. About 1 million people may leave the state each year, which is slightly more than the number projected to move in.

Illinois's population increase depends on new births, and they won't start to boost the state's population until after the turn of the century. Baby boomers are aging out of their childbearing years, and that could result in 882,832 births between 1995 and 2000. That number represents a 10 percent decrease from the preceding five-year period. Births may increase between 2000-05, but they won't approach the level of the 1990-95 period until 2015-20, when the number of women in childbearing years, especially Hispanics, begins to grow significantly.

Deaths contribute to the slow-growth picture in the early part of the projection period. A rural population aging in place may mean a slow increase in the number of deaths in Illinois to 2020. The greatest effect may be between 2000 and 2005, when deaths could be high and births low. Natural increase could reach a low point of 301,000 during those five years. It may be even lower in rural counties, whose young adults tend to migrate to more urban counties and the jobs they offer.

The share of elderly in rural counties will probably increase in coming years, but the overall share of elderly in Illinois won't. The state's share of "young" elderly peaked in 1990, when an estimated 11.2 percent of the population was aged 65 to 84. That share should continue to decline to 2010, reaching a low of 9.5 percent.

Beginning the following year -- one that the Social Security Administration has been eyeing warily for decades -- the first baby boomers turn 65. By 2020, they should boost the share of residents aged 65 to 84 to the 1990 level of 10.8 percent. Although Illinois is often perceived as an "old" state, its share of "young" elderly may be below the projected U.S. average of almost 16 percent in 2020. That could mean the elderly would have less political influence in Illinois than in other states, and that demand for senior-related social services may be lower than for the U.S.

The share of Illinois elderly who are very old -- aged 85 or older -- may also be below the U.S. average of 2 percent in 2020, at 1.2 percent. However, perhaps more importantly for state planners, the number of very old may drop 5 percent between 2000 and 2020, to about 165,500. That's slightly less than the estimated number in 1995.

The very old are more likely than younger elderly to need social and healthcare services. Illinois providers may need to beef up their capacities to 2010, when the 85-plus population may peak at 181,000, before it falls below its 1995 level.

The future of youth in Illinois can be found in its metropolitan areas. This is largely because there are large concentrations of jobs for which young adults are qualified, and because urban areas are usually where international migrants choose to settle.

Most immigrants are young. Hispanics in particular have high birth rates, which increases the number of young in counties where Hispanics are concentrated.

Thirty-nine percent of Illinois Hispanics were aged 19 or younger in 1995, compared with 28 percent of non-Hispanics. That share is projected to remain constant for Hispanics through 2020, and decline slightly for non-Hispanics.

Ten of the top-20 Illinois counties for projected population growth between 1990 and 2020 surround Chicago; an additional four are outside St. Louis. Other fast-growing counties border Springfield and Bloomington. The reason is jobs. As rural counties continue to lose jobs in agriculture and mining, Illinois's population will further concentrate around its big cities.

The population of Illinois may grow more slowly than average, but the income picture is decidedly better than for the U.S., especially in counties surrounding Chicago. In fact, the top-five counties in Illinois for per-capita income are near Chicago.

Estimated per-capita income for the state was $25,290 in 1995, compared with $23,200 for the U.S.

Metro-area jobs and rapid growth make for the state's highest incomes. Four of the top-five counties for personal per-capita incomes also have per-capita income above the state average: Lake ($35,930); DuPage ($34,840); Cook ($27,150); and McHenry ($26,200). The less-developed suburban counties of Kane and Will have per-capita income of $24,800 and $22,870, respectively.

The big population magnets in the Chicago area are suburban counties, not Cook County, where the city itself is located. Cook County may grow 5 percent between 1995 and 2020, to 5.4 million. However, that modest growth will not bring the county to its 1970 peak of 5.5 million.

Cook County would probably decline in population if it weren't a magnet for Hispanic immigrants. Three-fourths of the state's Hispanics lived in Cook County in 1995, and 92 percent lived in Cook and five other Chicago-area counties. In Cook

County, newly arriving Hispanics should offset projected declines in the non-Hispanic population between 1995 and 2020.

The number of non-Hispanics in the county is projected to decline 6 percent during the period. But a 65 percent increase in the Hispanic population will add 530,000 newcomers to the county between 1995 and 2020.

The growing diversity of the American populace means that Peoria will probably never be the perfect test market again. But it is expected to grow, at 2 percent between 1995 and 2000, to 186,440, and then another 1.5 percent to 189,280 in 2020. Those small numbers would be a big boost for a county that lost 9 percent of its residents in the 1980s. 14. 15.

-Canada

People

Population: 28,820,671 (July 1996 est.)

Age structure:

0-14 years: 21% (male 3,032,458; female 2,889,603)

15-64 years: 67% (male 9,663,955; female 9,660,648)

65 years and over: 12% (male 1,501,542; female 2,072,465) (July 1996 est.)

!Population growth rate: 1.06% (1996 est.)

Birth rate: 13.33 births/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Death rate: 7.17 deaths/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Net migration rate: 4.47 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Sex ratio:

at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.05 male(s)/female

15-64 years: 1 male(s)/female

65 years and over: 0.72 male(s)/female all ages: 0.97 male(s)/female (1996 est.)

Infant mortality rate: 6.1 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.)

Life expectancy at birth: total population: 79.07 years

Male: 75.67 years

Female: 82.65 years (1996 EST.)

Total fertility rate: 1.81 children born/woman (1996 EST.)

Nationality:

Ethnic divisions: British Isles origin 40%, French origin 27%, other European 20%, indigenous Indian and Eskimo 1.5%, other, mostly Asian 11.5%

Religions: Roman Catholic 45%, United Church 12%, Anglican 8%, other 35% (1991)

Languages: English (official), French (official)

Literacy: age 15 and over can read and write (1986 EST.)

Total population: 97%

Economy

GDP: purchasing power parity - $694 billion (1995 est.)

GDP real growth rate: 2.1% (1995 est.)

GDP per capita: $24,400 (1995 est.)

GDP composition by sector:

Labor force: 13.38 million

By occupation: services 75%, manufacturing 14%, agriculture 4%, construction 3%, other 4% (1988)

Unemployment rate: 9.5% (1995)

Consumption per capita: 16,133 kWh (1993)

Illicit drugs: illicit producer of cannabis for the domestic drug market; use of hydroponics technology permits growers to plant large quantities of high-quality marijuana indoors; growing role as a transit point for heroin and cocaine entering the US market

Defense expenditures: exchange rate conversion - $9.0 billion, 1.6% of GDP (FY95/96)

-Mexico

People

Population: 95,772,462 (July 1996 est.)

Age structure:

0-14 years: 36% (male 17,732,725; female 17,125,562)

15-64 years: 59% (male 27,562,285; female 29,165,138)

65 years and over: 5% (male 1,911,968; female 2,274,784) (July 1996 est.)

Population growth rate: 1.87% (1996 est.)

Birth rate: 26.24 births/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Death rate: 4.58 deaths/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Net migration rate: -2.97 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Sex ratio:

At birth: 1.05 male(s)/female

Under 15 years: 1.04 male(s)/female

15-64 years: 0.94 male(s)/female

65 years and over: 0.84 male(s)/female

All ages: 0.97 male(s)/female (1996 est.)

Infant mortality rate: 25 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.)

Life expectancy at birth:

Total population: 73.67 years

Male: 70.07 years

Female: 77.45 years (1996 est.)

Total fertility rate: 3.03 children born/woman (1996 est.)

Ethnic divisions: mestizo (Indian-Spanish) 60%, Amerindian or predominantly Amerindian 30%, Caucasian or predominantly

Caucasian 9%, other 1%

Religions: nominally Roman Catholic 89%, Protestant 6%

Languages: Spanish, various Mayan dialects

Literacy: age 15 and over can read and write (1995 est.)

Total population: 89.6%

Male: 91.8%

Female: 87.4%

Economy

GDP: purchasing power parity - $721.4 billion (1995 est.)

GDP real growth rate: -6.9% (1995 est.)

GDP per capita: $7,700 (1995 est.)

Inflation rate (consumer prices): 52% (1995 est.)

Labor force: 33.6 million (1994)

By occupation: services 31.7%, agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing 28%, commerce 14.6%, manufacturing 11.1%, construction 8.4%, transportation 4.7%, mining and quarrying 1.5%

Consumption per capita: 1,239 kWh (1993)

Illicit drugs: illicit cultivation of opium poppy and cannabis continues in spite of increasing government eradication; major supplier of heroin and marijuana to the US market; continues as the primary transshipment country for US-bound cocaine from South America; increasingly involved in the production and distribution of methamphetamine. )

Defense expenditures: exchange rate conversion - $2.24 billion, 0.9% of GDP (1996)

Population

Tota1....................86-88 million (1990)........[11th in the world]

!Growth Rate..............2% per Year (l991).........[was 3.5% in the 1960s]

Proportion Living in

Cities...................72% (l990).................[Was 40% in 1950]

Social Indicators

Life expectancy... 69 years (1991)

Infant mortality...36 per 1,000 births (1990)

Access to safe water...89% (1985-88)

Access to health facilities...85% (1985-88)

Rural children malnourished...50% (1990)

Rural families under poverty line...43% (1990)

Urban families under poverty line...23% (1990)

Living in extreme poverty...17 million (1990)

Literacy...92% (1990)

20.

People

Population: 266,476,278 (July 1996 est.)

Age structure:

0-14 years: 22% (male 29,718,390; female 28,335,934)

15-64 years: 65% (male 86,225,056; female 87,411,573)

65 years and over: 13% (male 13,850,234; female 20,021,655) (July 1996 est.)

Population growth rate: 0.91% (1996 est.)

Birth rate: 14.8-births/1,000 population (1996 EST.)

Death rate: 8.8-deaths/1,000 population (1996 EST.)

Net migration rate: 3.1-migrant(s)/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Sex ratio: at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.05 male(s)/female

15-64 years: 0.99 male(s)/female

65 years and over: 0.69 male(s)/female all ages: 0.96 male(s)/female (1996 EST.)

Infant mortality rate: 6.7 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 EST.)

Life expectancy at birth: total population: 75.95 years male: 72.65 years female: 79.41 years (1996 EST.)

Total fertility rate: 2.06 children born/woman (1996 EST.)

Total population: 97% male: 97% female: 97%

GDP: purchasing power parity - $7.2477 trillion (1995 EST.)

GDP real growth rate: 2.1% (1995 EST.)

GDP per capita: $27,500 (1995 EST.)

Labor force: 132.304 million (includes unemployed) (1995) by occupation: managerial and professional 28.3%, technical, sales and administrative support 30.0%, services 13.5%, manufacturing, mining, transportation, and crafts 25.3%, farming, forestry, and fishing 2.8%

Unemployment rate: 5.6% (December 1995)

Consumption electricity per capita: 11,236 kWh (1993)

Illicit drugs: illicit producer of cannabis for domestic consumption with 1987 production estimated at 3,500 metric tons or about 25% of the available marijuana; ongoing eradication program aimed at small plots and greenhouses has not reduced production

Defense Expenditures: 300 billion per year

Education

Percentage of GDP allocated to education (1991):

Mexico 3.6% ($180. per student per year)

U.S.A. 6.8% ($2000. per student per year)

Canada 7.1 % ($2000. per student per year)

Percentage of illiterate adults (1991):

Mexico 13%

U.S.A. 1%

Canada 1%

Number of students per elementary school teacher (1993):

Mexico (1990) 31-40

U.S.A. (1985) 22

Canada (1989) 17

Matriculation: Average number of students at each level (1989):

Elementary Level Secondary Level University

Male Female Male Female

Mexico 118 115 54 53 1,515

U.S.A. 101 100 98 99 5,596

Canada 105 105 104 105 5,034

Agriculture

Workable land per agricultural worker (hectares):

Per Worker Irrigated Pasture Forest

Mexico 2.7 0.6 8.1 5.0

U.S.A. 61.4 5.9 79.0 86.7

Canada 97.4 1.7 68.9 754.0

Tractors per agricultural worker (including all economically-active

agricultural workers)

Mexico 2 per 100 workers

U.S.A. 1.5 per 1 worker

Canada 1.6 per 1 worker

Media

Number of newspapers, televisions, and radios per 1,000 inhabitants (1993):

Newspapers Televisions Radios

Mexico 127 127 242

U.S.A. 259 814 2,122

Canada 231 626 1,023

21.

HDI GDI GEM

rank Country rank rank

1/Canada/ 1/ 6

4/USA / 5/ 7

50/Mexico/ 50/ 31

Human Development Index

High Human Development

Combined Real

1^st, GDP per

Life 2nd&3rd Real Human capita

expectancy level GDP Development (PPP$)

at Adult gross per Index rank

birth literacy enrolment capita (HDI) minus

HDI (yrs) rate ratio (PPP$) value HDI rank/Country/ 1994/(%)1994/ (%)1994/ 1994/ 1994/ rank/

1/Canada/ 79.0/ 99.0/ 100/ 21,459/ 0.960/ 7/

4/ USA/ 76.2/ 99.0/ 96/ 26,397/ 0.942/ -1/

50/Mexico/ 72.0/ 89.2/ 66/ 7,384/ 0.853/ 0/

25.

Size 96,807000 267,955,000 30,337,000

Age Peak 0-4 yrs. 35-39 yrs. 35-39 yrs.

Rate of natural increase 2.1 0.6 0.5

Bibliography

1. Methods and Models in Demography, Colin Newell, p.10
2. Reflections On Population, Rafael M Salas, p.282
3. Assessing the demographic impact of development projects, p.6
4. Assessing the demographic impact of development projects, p.5-6

5.Demography Department

Research School of Social Sciences

Australian National University

Canberra, ACT 0200

AUSTRALIA

6.Boom, Bust and Echo, David K. Foot, p.200

7. The General Social Survey (GSS), 1155 East 60th Street, Chicago, IL 60637

8. Bust and Echo, David Foot, pg. 201

9. Methods and Models of Demography, Colin Newell, pg. 83

10. The Wealthiest Small Cities Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

11. Cover story: Small is Beautiful

By Kevin Heubusch Taking It Further. This article is based on The New Rating Guide to Life in America's Small Cities Population figures are from the Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov. Personal per-capita income data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis; http://www.bea.doc.gov. http://www.census.gov.

12. The Fastest-Growing Small Cities

American Demographics, January 1998

13.Hari.Seldon.Jr@iki.fi

MIGRATION NEWS

Vol. 5, No. 2 February, 1998

Philip Martin, Department of Agricultural

Economics, University of California, Davis, California 95616 USA.

http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mm21/mm21.html.

http://heather.cs.ucdavis.edu/itaa.html

14.Tomorrow's Markets

Changes in the Heartland

By Kevin Heubusch

Behind the Numbers

http://www.census.gov.

15.Source: Illinois Bureau of the Budget

WebMaster@demographics.com American Demographics, January 1998

16. Ronald Lee, http://arrow.qal.berkeley.edu/papers/rlee/ccig/

http://arrow.qal.berkeley.edu/papers/rlee/ccig/

17. Report. The Department of Commerce: "America's New Deficit: The Shortage of Information Technology Workers," http://www.ta.doc.gov/reports/itsw/itsw.pdf

18.Allen Myerson, "Virtual Migrants: Need Programmers? Surf Abroad," New York Times, January 18, 1998. Amy Harmon, "With Boom in High Technology,

Software Jobs Go Begging," New York Times, January 13, 1998. Jonathan

Kaufman. Wall Street Journal, January 8, 1998.

19.Test Data," Washington Post, January 28, 1998. Eric Schmitt, "White House

Will Reject Advice to Abolish I.N.S., Officials Say," New York Times,

January 21, 1998.

20. Source: Mexico InfoPak: A Briefing source book for Community

Leaders. Produced by the InterHemispheric Education and Resource

Center the Southwest Voter Research Institute

21. Source: Mario B. Monroy, (Socios? (Asociados? (En sociedad?

Asimetr'ias entre Canada, U.S. y Mexico. CEE, RMALC, SIPRO, Nov,

1993.JUST THE FACTS

22.Trend Cop, This Is a Test, by Cheryl Russell, Editor-in-chief of New Strategist Publications (Ithaca, New York), and executive editor of The Boomer

Report (Age Wave Communications Corporation: Emeryville, California)

American Demographics, January 1998

23.Take the Money and Run by Shannon Dortch,

American Demographics, January 1998

24.Boom, Bust and Echo, David K. Foot, pg. 145

25. http://www.undp.org/undp/hdro/hdi1.htm

Statistics Canada

http://www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/people.htm

U.S. Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/socdemo.htm

http://arrow.qal.berkeley.edu/index.html

http://www.demon.co.uk/mexuk/update/june96/women.html

http://www.tempe.gov/netsites/bn310.htm

http://www.ags.inegi.gob.mx/

http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/popclock

http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbsum.html

http://www.upa.pdx.edu//BB/citation.html

United Nations

http://www.undp.org/undp/hdro/anatools.htm

http://daisy.waterloo.ca/`alopez-o/politics/mexstats.html

COMMENTS? If you have any suggestions or comments concerning this paper please send them to the seminar, mentioning demography in the subject line.

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